



FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

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The Allied Presence in Berlin: Legal Basis

by Karl Loewenstein

On November 27, 1958 the U.S.S.R. denounced the presence of the allies in West Berlin as an anachronism, requested within six months negotiations for their withdrawal, and offered West Berlin the status of a free city with self-government. Simultaneously, the U.S.S.R. gave notice that it considers "null and void" its agreement of September 12, 1944 with the United States and Britain delineating the zones of occupation in Germany and providing for the joint administration of Berlin, as well as the agreement of May 1, 1945 between the Big Three and France establishing control machinery for the occupation of Germany and Berlin. It also declared that Moscow "at an appropriate moment" planned to begin negotiations with East Germany to transfer to it all the functions hitherto performed by Soviet authorities under the now-renounced agreements. On January 20 Communist party secretary Walter Ulbricht stated that this transfer would take place on May 30.

This unilateral action of the U.S.S.R. raises two interrelated questions: First, On what grounds does the occupation of West Berlin by the three Western allies rest?; and, second, Is Russia's denunciation, or, to use the appropriate legal term, cancellation of the

various agreements, legal under international law?

The story of the postwar arrangements on Berlin begins in October 1943, when the foreign ministers of the United States, Britain and the U.S.S.R., meeting in Moscow, agreed in principle on joint responsibility for, and joint occupation of, defeated Germany. This decision was confirmed by the Big Three at Teheran in November 1943. Subsequently the European Advisory Commission (EAC), established in London for postwar planning, one of the most influential although least publicized agencies, in its Protocol of September 12, 1944—one of the agreements formally denounced by the U.S.S.R. in its November 27, 1958 note—set forth the boundaries of the zones to be occupied by each of the three powers respectively, the sectors of Greater Berlin to be occupied by each of them and the joint administration of Berlin by a common authority, subsequently called Kommandatura. On November 14, 1944 the EAC reached agreement on the establishment of the Allied Control Council, which was to function as the government of Germany for the interim period until an indigenous German government could be established.

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These are the basic documents providing for the presence of the allies in Berlin. However, no agreement on the West's access to Berlin was reached at that time. A tentative proposal to have all three zones of occupation converge on Berlin, as well as a British suggestion for a corridor through the Russian zone to Berlin, was turned down by the United States War Department for military and administrative reasons which at that time appeared persuasive. The Yalta Conference of the Big Three in February 1945 confirmed the arrangements reached in London, and implemented them by assigning to France a separate zone of occupation together with a sector of Berlin and by making France a member of the Allied Control Council. The Yalta accord was followed by the EAC agreement of May 1, 1945 on the control mechanism in Germany, also denounced by the U.S.S.R. on November 27, 1958.

The actual military conquest of Berlin was left to the Russians. At that time the United States government, as well as General Dwight D. Eisenhower and his military commanders, did not regard Berlin as a worthwhile military objective for the West, giving exclusive priority to the annihilation of the German forces in the field. By contrast, the Russians regarded the conquest of Berlin as of paramount importance, for moral and prestige reasons.

On V-E Day — May 8, 1945 — American forces were deep in the territory designated as the Russian zone while the Russians, at a heavy price in lives, had finally seized all

of Berlin. At that time it was evident that the Russians would not permit the Allied entry into Berlin until the allies withdrew to their respective zones. Consequently, when the four commanders issued their proclamation of June 5, 1945 assuming supreme authority over defeated Germany, they decided to honor the mutual obligations undertaken by their respective governments. Finally, the Potsdam agreement of August 2, 1945, to which France was not a party, confirmed the antecedent agreements of the four Allied commanders and assigned to the Allied Control Council specific functions, among them the "four D's"—denazification, democratization, demilitarization and deconcentration. It is important to note, however, that the Potsdam agreement made no mention of the four-power regime to be established in Berlin.

Access to Berlin

In connection with the exchange of territories between the Western powers and the U.S.S.R. the problem of the access of the allies to their sectors in Berlin called for a practical solution. This problem, which at that time was considered as military rather than political, was left to the Allied commanders. On June 29, 1945 (and on two subsequent visits) General Lucius D. Clay, as the representative of General Eisenhower, together with the latter's political adviser to Germany, Robert D. Murphy, met with General Georgi K. Zhukov at the latter's headquarters in Karlshorst, Berlin—as described by General Clay in his book, *Deci-*

sion in Germany (Garden City, New York, Doubleday, 1950).

General Clay, after first requesting Western access by two highways, three rail lines and the air space required, agreed, "as a temporary arrangement," to the allocation of one main highway and one rail line, as well as two air corridors. He reserved, however, the right to reopen the issue in the Allied Control Council.

With disarming frankness General Clay notes:

"I must admit that we did not then fully realize that the requirement of unanimous consent would enable a Soviet veto in the Allied Control Council to block all of our future efforts. . . . I think now that I was mistaken in not at this time making free access to Berlin a condition to our withdrawal into our occupation zone. . . . I doubt very much if anything in writing would have done any more to prevent the events which took place than the verbal agreement which we made."

General Clay also abstained from putting the agreement in writing, on the ground—which some critics may question—that he did not wish to imply, by a written stipulation, that he had waived the right of unrestricted access to Berlin. At that time the movement and supply of Western military forces only were involved. It apparently did not occur to General Clay that some day the routes might be required to supply the population of West Berlin. This omission, however, was subsequently rectified by the decision of the Allied Control Council on November

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30, 1945 which granted the West three air corridors to be used without advance notice. Until Moscow's blockade of Berlin started in June 1948, this arrangement, on the whole, worked out satisfactorily.

After the Soviet blockade, started in June 1948, had been frustrated by the Allied airlift, an agreement was reached in New York on May 4, 1949 by Ambassador Philip C. Jessup and the U.S.S.R. permanent representative to the United Nations, Jacob A. Malik. In this agreement the U.S.S.R. agreed to end its blockade of Berlin, and the Western powers agreed to lift their restrictions on the communications with East Germany, imposed in reprisal for the blockade. At the present time, of the total traffic to West Berlin (of which supplies to the allies' garrisons form only a minute part) 36.7 percent moves by the highway; 34.9 percent, by rail; 28.3 percent, by water; and only 0.7 percent, by plane.

Finally, the Nine-Power Agreement on Germany and European Defense of October 3, 1954 concluded in Paris between the Western powers and West Germany, which ended the Allied occupation and restored full sovereignty to West Germany, reserved to the allies "the existing rights and responsibilities . . . relating to Berlin." The U.S.S.R., for its part, in an agreement with East Germany on September 20, 1955, recognized the sovereignty of the German Democratic Republic and reserved for itself the control of traffic—both personnel and freight—destined for Berlin. It is very doubtful that such a "control" is compatible with the Clay-Zhukov and Jessup-Malik agreements, and whether it can be legally transferred to East Germany, as the U.S.S.R. is now planning to do.

These are the basic facts about Berlin as established by existing documents. The second issue under

discussion is whether the U.S.S.R. is entitled, under international law, to denounce unilaterally its agreements with the Western powers concerning their unrestricted access to West Berlin.

According to the generally accepted rules of international law, all treaties become valid upon manifestation of mutual consent. No specific form being required, oral agreements are as valid as written ones. Moreover, the right of Allied access to Berlin has been confirmed by the Allied Control Council, the Jessup-Malik agreement of 1949 and uncontested practice for over 13 years.

Can U.S.S.R. Cancel?

Are there valid grounds on which the U.S.S.R. can abrogate the existing agreements about Berlin? International law establishes four grounds for the termination of treaties, described by the rather forbidding terms of (1) expiration, (2) dissolution, (3) voidance and (4) cancellation. In the case of Berlin there is no question of expiration, since the treaties were concluded for an indefinite time. Dissolution can be justified under three headings—mutual consent, withdrawal by notice and vital change of circumstances.

In this case there is no question of mutual consent. Withdrawal by notice on the part of the Russians is ruled out, because even though the arrangements for free Western access to Berlin are not "setting up an everlasting condition of things," to quote the leading treatise on international law by L. Oppenheim and H. Lauterpacht, they are intended to serve until a final settlement of the Berlin question in a future peace treaty with Germany as a whole has been concluded. Nor can, by any stretch of the imagination, the existence of vital circumstances—the famous *clausula rebus sic stantibus*—be claimed by the Russians, since the

principle of *pacta sunt servanda* (the sanctity of treaties) must yield to exceptional situations only if the obligation stipulated in the treaty should "imperil the existence or the vital development of one of the parties." Nor are the contingencies that would justify termination of a treaty applicable to the present situation.

Thus the three grounds discussed above for the abrogation of the treaties are to be ruled out peremptorily. The situation is less unequivocal, however, with reference to cancellation, the fourth recognized ground, and it is just on this aspect that the Soviet note of November 27, 1958 relies. Under international law, a treaty may be cancelled in case of violation by the other party to it. This rule is applied in one of the leading United States cases (*Charlton v. Kelly*, 229 U.S. 447, 1913). Violation does not annul the treaty automatically but it entitles the party which has observed it faithfully to cancel it at the party's discretion.

In his November 27 note Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev accused the Western powers of violating the Potsdam agreement, with particular emphasis on the rebuilding of German militarism, including West Germany's membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. There have been mutual recriminations between the Western allies and the U.S.S.R. about alleged violations of the Potsdam agreement. These accusations, if legally relevant, would require special examination. If it had to be legally established which side started the violations the problem might well prove as insoluble as the question of whether the egg or the chicken came first. Suffice it here to state that on-the-scene observers of the Allied Control Council, as well as objective students of the problem, believe that both the Western allies and the U.S.S.R. are guilty of vio-

lation. This is hardly surprising considering the fact that their divergent policy aims made the Potsdam agreement inherently inexecutable. For purposes of this discussion, however, all that needs to be said is that Moscow's claim that it is entitled to the abrogation of the Berlin agreements because of their alleged violations by the Western powers is itself invalidated by the requirement under international law that the treaty which is claimed to be violated by the other party must be denounced within a reasonable time after such violation has become known to the party which remains faithful to it. This requirement has not been fulfilled by the U.S.S.R. Mere protests—and of these there has been no shortage—are not sufficient. More-

over, the Russians did not denounce the Potsdam agreement itself which, since the restoration of sovereignty to both parts of Germany, is devoid of substance, and in any case contains nothing about Berlin. What they denounced are agreements on the access routes to Berlin, and the Russians do not allege that these have been violated by the allies. Thus, cancellation as a ground for abrogation likewise does not hold in this case.

Under these circumstances, the Western powers, in standing firm on Berlin, are standing on the firm ground of international law. Yet from the political point of view one must concede that Khrushchev has an argument when he contends that, now that the Potsdam agreement is

defunct, the Allied presence in West Berlin is, if not a dangerous anachronism, at least a dangerous situation calling for a new and realistic reappraisal.

Even if the Berlin situation is adjusted in the months to come, it cannot fail, with the passage of time, to become ever more untenable. In this writer's opinion the practicable solution would be the transfer by the allies of their responsibilities for West Berlin to the government of West Germany, with ironclad American guarantees for the continued *status quo* of West Berlin's freedom.

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FOREIGN POLICY FORUM

UN Force for Berlin

by W. Friedmann

Dr. Friedmann, professor of law and director of international legal research at Columbia University's School of Law, is author of The Allied Military Government of Germany (London, London Institute of World Affairs, 1947). Reprinted from a letter to The New York Times on January 14, with permission of the newspaper and the author.

Any attempt to reach some measure of agreement with Russia on Berlin and Germany is still hampered by the West's vacillations as to what positions could be negotiable.

The Western powers are united—and right—in refusing to consider unilateral withdrawal of their forces from Berlin. In this they have not only the legal support of the 1949 Paris agreement—concluded after the Berlin blockade—but also the

near-unanimous backing of two and a quarter million West Berliners.

The Western powers should, however, actively explore the possibility of UN supervision over the status of Berlin by a token UN force. Such a contingent could not defend West Berlin against a Soviet attack, but neither can the present token Allied forces. Any interference with the status established by UN guarantee, and protected by a UN force, would be an open act of aggression.

The West could suggest free elections for the whole of Berlin, so as to reunify it as a free city, neither East nor West German. This is most likely to be rejected by the Kremlin, as the election would result in an anti-Communist majority. The West could then insist with added force on the protection of the present status, and guarantees for freedom of communication in and out of the city. It is in regard to wider German solutions that the West should display more realism than thus far.

The counterproposal of free elec-

tions for the whole of Germany, with freedom for the new government to decide whether to remain in NATO or not, is no serious avenue to a peaceful solution of the German problem. It implies the possibility of NATO missile bases on the Oder-Neisse line. No power in the position of Russia can be expected to agree to such a deterioration in its security. No peace treaty for the present would, in a fluid situation, be better than another Versailles.

German Missile Bases Problem

We are, therefore, likely to remain with the continuing reality of a partitioned Germany and the possibilities of a limited rapprochement and reduction of tensions in that area. It is no use calling two-power or twenty-eight-power conferences unless the West, including West Germany, realistically reconsiders two positions on which it has, hitherto been wholly immobile:

The *de facto* acknowledgment of East Germany—which, for all the

protestations, has long been the tacit assumption in trade negotiations and other contacts between East and West Germany. This may stop short of diplomatic recognition. But continuous refusal to acknowledge a political reality, without attempting to alter it, will increasingly embarrass the West.

The key to possible Soviet concessions may be the question of intermediate missile bases in West Germany. Intermediate missiles are "first-strike," not "second-strike" weapons. As weapons of defense or counterattack, they are of small if any value. Moreover, there is considerable opposition to these bases by most of America's NATO allies—including eminent military experts—while their installation in West Germany might well induce an alternative Social Democratic government—or a British Labor government—to leave, or loosen its ties with NATO. United States policy, based entirely on the immortality of Adenauer and his policy, runs the danger that fundamentally pro-Western, alternative governments will openly clash with United States policy, with catastrophic results for Western unity.

In this connection the modified Rapacki Plan may deserve more serious attention than it has had so far. The plan now demands the prohibition of the production of atomic weapons in Poland, Czechoslovakia, East and West Germany, and a supervised obligation not to provide armies with nuclear weapons which are not so far equipped with them. It does not demand any change in the status of forces already equipped with such weapons, for example, United States forces in Germany. The West might well consider accepting the prohibition of missile bases while insisting on full tactical equipment of the German forces until a wider disarmament agreement

should be reached between the major powers.

Both sides are vitally interested in the maintenance of peace. But this can be attained only by give and take and the reappraisal of positions maintained only because nobody has the courage to reassess them.

Confederation of Two Germanys

by Louis Fischer

Mr. Fischer, a former correspondent in Moscow and Berlin, is the author of Russia Revisited: A New Look at Russia and Her Satellites (Doubleday, 1957). Reprinted from a letter to The New York Times on January 13, with permission of the newspaper and the author.

Premier Khrushchev has proposed that West Berlin be made a free city without foreign troops. May I suggest that in dealing with this development American spokesmen refrain from returning the eternal negative and advance some constructive, positive ideas of their own? Why not urge that all of Berlin, West and East, be converted into a free city with a United Nations police force and guaranteed communications by land, water and air with West and East Germany.

East Berliners work in West Berlin. West Berlin gets some of its electricity from East Berlin. An urban railway, part subway, part elevated, connects the two segments of the city. Even today movement between them is relatively unhindered. There is every reason to make the city whole again.

Such a reunited free Berlin might become the capital of an all-German confederation. Moscow and the East German Communist government have repeatedly demanded this con-

federation. The West German government of Dr. Adenauer has as often rejected it on the ground that there can be no union with the U.S.S.R.'s East German puppet state.

Moscow, moreover, insists that in the two-Germanys confederation East Germany be allowed to retain its "social achievements," by which the Kremlin undoubtedly means nationalized industry, a one-party system, labor discipline without effective trade unions, etc.

Experiment Might Succeed

I recognize the incongruity and practical difficulty of marrying the West German elephant with 50 million inhabitants to the East German seal with 17 million. Nevertheless, the experiment might succeed. West Germans could enter such a strange association with full confidence. It would not be long before East German workers would ask for free trade unions.

Instead of standing firm on free elections as a condition for German reunification—something Moscow has often rejected—why not reunify first in the faith that democracy is so attractive and compulsive, especially to people who have lived under a dictatorship, that the East Germans will soon find a way of forcing their masters to agree to free elections? I have no fear that the Communist handful in East Germany, even with Russian encouragement, could swallow the West German giant.

I can imagine how the proposed all-German confederation would work. There would be no need for Dr. Adenauer to meet or consult with the leaders of East Germany. West and East Germany would continue to function as before in their respective capitals. But a new confederal council would be created in reunified Berlin consisting of West and East Germans to deal with all-German trade, travel, post, telephone

and telegraph communications, the free entry of newspapers and other printed matter, radio broadcasts and similar questions.

In time a single stable currency might be established for both parts of Germany, the assumption being that the good would drive out the bad. Ultimately, Germany might achieve reunification on this installment plan faster than if we wait for

an agreement among the great powers.

As part of the bargain for a free reunited Berlin and a two-Germans confederation, West Germany might recognize the present western boundary of Poland and establish diplomatic relations with the Gomulka regime. This would serve other desirable ends. Once these steps had been taken, a favorable climate

would be created for further negotiations on armaments.

No surrender on West Berlin is a necessity, but it is not the ultimate and only wisdom. Firmness without flexibility is sterile and could be dangerous. It seems that Moscow is ready to negotiate, else Mikoyan would not have come here and acted as he has. America should have a counterplan.



WASHINGTON NEWSLETTER

Big Power Parley in Offing

The visit to Washington of Russia's first deputy premier Anastas I. Mikoyan produced no agreement. But none was expected. It resulted in no new proposals or counterproposals. But that was not surprising. What came as a surprise were the extent, the freedom, the seriousness—and on the final day, the bitterness—with which Mr. Mikoyan discussed the critical issues dividing Moscow and the West.

It was not the basic issues of Berlin, reunification, a German peace treaty or European security that touched off the explosion on Mr. Mikoyan's last day in Washington. Instead it was two other matters—important but largely secondary: trade and press freedoms. Mr. Mikoyan is undoubtedly unaccustomed, either in Russia or in Eastern Europe or in most countries he visits, to having officials turn down his trade proposals. This is what Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs C. Douglas Dillon did. Mr. Mikoyan wanted to talk about loans for Russian purchases. Mr. Dillon reminded him of a United States law that forbids loans to countries which have not settled old debts. Mr. Mikoyan wanted to get some preferential tariff arrangements with the United

States. Mr. Dillon reminded him that Russia had no reciprocal trade agreement with this country and that such preferential treatment goes only to nations which have such agreements.

The result was that Mr. Mikoyan charged the United States with continuing to wage cold war on the trade front. The State Department quickly replied by calling his charges "fatuous."

Mr. Mikoyan is also doubtless unaccustomed, either in Russia or in Eastern Europe or in most countries he visits, to having newsmen needle or even contradict him. It was quite clear that on his last day in Washington he was smarting from the rough time he had been given on *Meet the Press*; particularly by Lawrence Spivak. In consequence, from the shelter of the National Press Club podium, he read Mr. Spivak and the American press a lecture on fair play and good manners. By coincidence the State Department, at the same moment, aroused by his criticism of its trade "rigidity," took the opportunity to question Mikoyan's "fair play" and good manners in visiting American homes uninvited to check on living conditions—and in taking photographs of untidy kitchens or

bedrooms. Imagine what would happen to an American who did that in the U.S.S.R., it commented, or what use will be made of those photographs in the U.S.S.R.!

Berlin Time Bomb Defused

On the principal cold war issues, it is generally agreed, Mikoyan did not budge. He defended his government's official positions on Berlin, on German reunification, on a German peace treaty, on European security. But he did make clear at the same time that such subjects are discussible. This does not mean they are negotiable, or that the East-West gulf on these issues is going to be bridged. But it does seem to indicate that the Russians have not closed their minds on these matters. And if Washington and its NATO allies are also open to serious exploration of differences (as also seems apparent) then some good after all may come from Mikoyan's visit. What his visit really did was to break the padlock to diplomatic negotiations without actually opening the door. Whether East and West officials can now agree on time, place and participants for a Big Power meeting is the next question.

Mikoyan, however, definitely de-

D fused the Berlin time bomb. He said repeatedly that Moscow's decision to turn West Berlin approaches over to the East Germans in May was not an "ultimatum." He said this was a "proposal," and the U.S.S.R. was awaiting "counterproposals." He even confided at one point that Moscow may have overstated its Berlin price intentionally to allow for some bargaining.

On the larger issue of German re-

unification, it was Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, rather than Mr. Mikoyan, who appeared to provide some maneuverability. Mr. Dulles created a 24-hour sensation by suggesting at his January 13 press conference that reunification might be possible by means other than "free elections." It soon developed, however, that the United States and its allies had said the same thing in notes to Moscow six months ago, but

so far had received no encouragement from Moscow, which still holds that federation of the two Germanys is the only way, with free elections conspicuous by their absence.

One thing seems clear. The Mikoyan visit, initiated entirely by the government of the Soviet Union appears to have been its opening move to bring about renewal of East-West talks.

NEAL STANFORD



FOREIGN POLICY SPOTLIGHT

A 'Better Neighbor' Policy for Latin America?

Foreign offices the world over have phalanxes of experts—on politics, economics, history, geography, propaganda, public relations. But as one watches the dramatic unrolling of events around the globe, it increasingly seems as if what foreign offices most lack—and need—are experts in understanding the psychology of other peoples.

It may well be, as some American commentators said during the visit of Russia's first deputy premier, Anastas I. Mikoyan, that with the best will possible, and no matter how helpful experts might be, there is no possibility at the present time of establishing communications between the United States and the Communist powers, Russia and China. Given a lack of common basic premises, some argue, there can be no understanding, and the best we can hope for is a warless stalemate. If one accepts this to be the case, the question still arises, Can we do better than we have done in communicating, not with far-away Communist countries, but with our non-Communist "good neighbors" in Latin America?

The raucous, and sometimes frightening, reception accorded to

Vice President Richard M. Nixon during his visit to Latin America in the spring of 1958 caused a shock in the United States which still preoccupies our most thoughtful citizens. Had we been profoundly mistaken about the attitudes of Latin Americans toward this country? Or had recent acts of omission or commission on our part erased the "good neighbor" sentiments we believed once flourished under the administrations of Herbert Hoover and Franklin D. Roosevelt? And if Washington had committed mistakes, what could we do to make "better neighbors" of the 20 countries of Latin America?

Economic Remedies

One of the first remedies which came to mind was that of improving economic relations through trade and aid. Although the 1958 recession did not encourage expansion of imports which compete with American products—such as copper from Chile or lead and zinc from Peru and Mexico—it was pointed out by students of Latin America that the United States should do everything in its power to improve the trading position of the Latin American coun-

tries. Otherwise, it was argued, our neighbors, thwarted in their efforts to sell their raw materials and foodstuffs in the United States, might turn to the Soviet bloc for markets. Among the principal remedies suggested were an inter-American development bank, to which the United States would contribute \$400 million, and United States participation in international agreements to stabilize the prices of such Latin American commodities as coffee.

How About Dictatorships?

The Latin American countries, which since World War II have often complained that the United States has contributed far more generously to the rehabilitation of Europe, through the Marshall Plan and other aid programs, and even to the development of Asia and the Middle East than to its Western Hemisphere neighbors, warmly welcomed the news of increased North American aid to their precarious economies. But it soon became apparent that what was uppermost in the minds of the 17 out of 20 democratic governments was the problem of Washington's aid, real or fancied, to existing or previous dictatorships, often head-

ed by military leaders, which have ruled Latin American countries during recent years. The United States, it was asserted from Argentina to Venezuela, from Guatemala to Cuba, favored dictatorships, gave or sold them arms, extended economic aid to them and remained aloof from popular movements for democratization.

This controversy came to a dramatic climax following the victory in Cuba of guerrilla leader Fidel Castro and his forces over the army of dictator Fulgencio Batista, who had received or purchased arms, equipment and planes from the United States and Britain. While Washington promptly recognized the provisional government of President Manuel Urrutia, established by Castro on January 2, many prominent Americans, including members of Congress and labor leaders, indignantly protested against the drum-head trials, followed by executions, dealt out by Castro and his associates to men and women who had supported Batista.

To these protests Castro, with what sounded like strong anti-American sentiment, replied by asking why the American press and other news media, as well as United States spokesmen of all kinds, had failed to be equally eloquent in denouncing what he called the crimes of Batista and his followers, and warned the United States against intervention in

Cuba's affairs. Castro's contention that crimes committed by Batista supporters had to be punished was backed by Catholic and Protestant religious spokesmen in Cuba. And President Muñoz Marín of Puerto Rico urged United States citizens to be more patient with the new Cuban leaders.

"Abrazo" for Democracies

The dilemma faced by North American officials in their policy toward Latin America is how to show our preference for democracy in countries which may not yet be prepared politically, economically, and socially for democratic institutions as we know them. Dr. Milton S. Eisenhower, president of Johns Hopkins University, in his January 3 report to President Eisenhower on United States-Latin American relations, suggested a psychological remedy which could prove of genuine value. He urged—in line with a recommendation made by Mr. Nixon on his return from Latin America—that “we have an ‘abrazo’ for democratic leaders, and a formal handshake for dictators.” We should refrain, he said, “from granting special recognition to a Latin American dictator, regardless of the temporary advantage that might seem to be promised by such an act.” At the same time he emphatically declared that we should not withdraw our

programs from Latin American countries which are ruled by dictators. Dr. Eisenhower added: “Non-recognition and noncooperation would not help another nation achieve democracy.”

Even more important for our efforts to cultivate “good neighbors” to the South is to realize that Latin Americans, like other inhabitants of less developed countries who may be poor but nevertheless take pride in what they have achieved in the past and are creating today, regard friendship with the United States as a two-way street. As Father Gustave Weigel, S.J. has put it in his October 1958 article, “A Theologian Looks at Latin America,” in *The Review of Politics*: “It is not only one friend who does the giving. Both are involved in that action. . . . Perhaps,” says Father Weigel, “true charity is not irrelevant to foreign policy. . . . If we want Latin American friendship, we must treat the Latin Americans as loved friends. A friend knows the weakness and idiosyncrasies of his friend, but he wisely puts them in context and he respects their reality. It is a poor friend who would exploit them.” This is good advice for North Americans.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

(The fifth of nine articles on “‘Great Decisions . . . 1959’—Reshaping Foreign Policy Amid Revolutions”—a comprehensive review of American foreign policy.)

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